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 Doing business with corruption
When we think about trade barriers hindering
developing countries, we often think of tariffs
and regulations. However, IGC research
suggests another hidden cost, corruption at
border posts, plays a signiﬁcant but
underappreciated role in hindering trade and
development
When we think about the costs for the developing world to
engage in international trade, what often comes to mind are the
cost of tariffs, transport and non-tariff barriers, usually in the
form of stringent regulatory requirements that the products they
are trying to trade have to meet. However, there are other
hidden, less predictable, costs that firms still need to grapple
with when trying to move goods across space: corruption at
border posts. With the World Bank estimating that the burden
to the global economy per year is US$ 1 trillion, or 3% of its
GDP, corruption may play an important role in hindering trade.
But how can corruption affect firms’ trading decisions?
Costs versus beneﬁts
On the one hand, corruption can be beneficial to firms.
Corruption, conceived as ‘grease’ to oil the wheels, can allow
firms to overcome cumbersome regulations, by providing
underpaid bureaucrats with incentives to perform and so
improving allocative efficiency. On the other hand, corruption
could have a negative impact, acting as a form of distortionary
taxation which reduces allocative efficiency via lost revenues for
government and the increased transaction costs, uncertainty,
and unenforceable contracts which hamper business activity.
Business behaviour
To understand how corruption is affecting firms’ behaviour, we
need to look at how corruption alters the marginal price of the
public service to firms, and how their demand for the service
changes in response to variations in that marginal price.
We examined this question in the specific context of how
corruption could increase the cost of international trade in Sub
Saharan Africa. To do so, we looked at firms in Northeastern
South Africa with a choice between using two ports with very
different levels of corruption: Maputo in Mozambique or
Durban in South Africa. We drew a random sample of three
types of firms: those drawn from an area equidistant to the two
ports, an area in South Africa that would be considerably closer
to the more corrupt port of Maputo and Mozambican firms
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located close to Maputo, which did not have the option of
shipping through the port of Durban.
An important aspect of this setup was that the location of firms
and the decision of which product to trade pre-dated the
opening of the Maputo port to international business following
an almost two-decade long civil war in Mozambique. By
collecting information on directly observed bribe payments for
the shipment of different types of products, we could then
combine this information to see how corruption affects firms’
choice of which port to use.
The price of corruption
An important finding was that corruption varied significantly
depending on the type of product being shipped. In particular,
South African products that fell under a high tariff grouping
according to the tariff code of Mozambique were more
vulnerable to being stopped to pay a bribe when travelling from
Maputo to South Africa. Falling under a high tariff grouping
according to the tariff code of a neighbouring country was
uncorrelated with any important shipment attributes such as its
size, value, or level of perishability, and was uncorrelated with
whether that product would ultimately pay a high or low tariff
once arriving at its final destination in South Africa. This
strategy thus allows us to see how corruption affects South
African firms’ choice of which port to use, and how firms
substitute higher transport costs for higher corruption costs.
What we found indicates that firms do respond to the price
effects of corruption, organising production in a way that
increases or decreases demand for the public service. We found
that different border bureaucracies created opportunities for
officials to engage in two different types of corruption. First,
there was indeed collusive corruption where officials were able
to sell tariff evasion, mostly to Mozambican firms importing
goods through Maputo. This reduced trade costs and meant
there were high rents acquired by private agents (as bribes were
often only 0.2% of the total tariff due) and significant losses in
government revenue (equal to, on average, a 5% nominal tariff
reduction). However, we also observed instances of coercive
corruption, with private agents being forced to pay an
additional fee to see the shipments go through, thus increasing
trade costs for the firm.
Pricing peace of mind
Of the two types, coercive corruption affected South African
firms’ choice of which port to use. Given the chance that an
imported good would fall under a high tariff code in
Mozambique (and so have a higher chance of being subjected to
coercive corruption in Mozambique) firms appeared to prefer to
double their transport costs and ship their imports through the
port of Durban just to avoid the bribe. In the most extreme
case, the cost incurred to reroute via Durban rather than
Maputo (where the mean bribe was triple what it was in
Durban) was three times higher than the cost of the actual
bribe. For South African firms that have 57% lower transport
costs to Maputo rather than Durban, 46% still chose to use
Durban – that figure jumped to 75% of firms for perishable
cargo, and 74% for urgent cargo. This is hard to square with
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cargo, and 74% for urgent cargo. This is hard to square with
standard price theory and suggests that it is the uncertainty
created by corruption that firms strongly dislike.
The cost of this diversion to a less corrupt port went beyond the
additional transport costs directly incurred by the firms: it
created imbalanced flows of cargo through the transport
network, introducing significant distortions in local transport
markets. Overall, this research suggests that reducing
corruption may improve allocative efficiency, but that there
could be heterogeneous effects on firm-level trade costs
depending on whether the reduction is in coercive or collusive
forms of corruption.
3 implications for policymakers
There are some implications from this we can draw for policy:
Firstly, incentives for corruption are partly shaped by the
organisational structure of public bureaucracies, as these can
create differential structural opportunities for bureaucrats to
extract different types of bribes. Two possible options are to
reduce in-person contact between private agents and port
officials, or reducing the steps in the process of public service
delivery (e.g. using online submission of documents and single
windows for the submission of clearance documents)
Secondly, a better understanding of the rules of thumb used by
different officials to identify bribe opportunities would enable
more targeted anti-corruption strategies.
Thirdly, the distribution of rents between public and private
agents will determine the degree of public support anti-
corruption policies will have: if private agents are getting large
rents by for instance evading tariffs; it will be difficult to rely on
them to enforce anti-corruption measures.
Numerous factors shape how bureaucrats engage in different
types of corruption and these can in turn change the costs and
benefits for firms involved in international trade. At a more
aggregate level, the effects of corruption can go beyond price
effects for firms, to generate imbalanced trade flows and lost
government revenues. More effective evidence and research-
based anti-corruption strategies provide a great opportunity for
governments to start cleaning up corruption at borders, thus
providing the developing world with a greater chance at reaping
the benefits brought by international trade.
